The Butcher of Burundi

Somalia: Mission Possible

Two weeks ago, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council recommended that the mandated strength of its peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) be raised from 8000 to 20,000 troops. It also called on the international community to blockade Somali ports and enforce a no-fly zone over the country to interdict resupply for Islamist rebels fighting to overthrow the internationally recognized government.

As the UN mulls over this proposal, events on the ground continue to give an indication of the effect increased troop numbers can have.

Since 2007, AU peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi have been deployed in Mogadishu under both an AU and UN mandate and at the invitation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. Their task is to support the decade-long Somali peace process and the transitional institutions it has generated.

For much of this time, AMISOM has been seriously under-resourced and undermanned. Nonetheless, the troops succeeded in their foremost task of protecting the Transitional Federal Government from Al Qaida liked extremist groups who have foresworn the peace process. In July, however, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development resolved to send a further 2000 troops, bringing the AU mission to its mandated strength of 8000. By mid-August, half of the IGAD troops had been inserted into Mogadishu and the effect have been quick and dramatic.

In June, the TFG controlled just 5 districts in the capital. Now, with the support of the IGAD reinforcements the TFG has managed to gain ground and now controls nearly half of the capital’s 16 districts. The gains are all the more remarkable considering that they were made in the face of a so-called “terminal offensive” launched by the extremist group, Al Shabab during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

These successes have provided a springboard for the TFG to launch its long-awaited offensive to retake the rest of the country. Last week, the TFG and its allies captured Beled-Hawo, a southwestern Somali town near the Kenyan border, deep in the heart of al Shabaab territory - a huge blow to the insurgents’ image of invincibility. Government forces are now at the doorstep of the strategically important town of Beled weyne, Hiiraan’s regional capital, threatening the insurgents’ grip over South and Central Somalia.

The losses suffered by the insurgents have amplified clan divisions and disputes over command, the policy of denying access to humanitarian organizations trying to help the suffering population in Central and South Somalia, and the role of foreign fighters. According to the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington think tank that monitors global security, the failure of the Ramadan offensive, led to “a major rift between Al Shabab’s emir, Sheikh Ahmad Abdi Godane and his deputy, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow.”

This is significant because, as US global security consultancy, Stratfor, says, it represents a split between the group’s nationalist and internationalist elements. According to Stratfor, Godane “is considered the leader of the internationalist elements, coordinating closely with foreign jihadists from al Qaeda who have joined its ranks over the last few years,” and is “responsible for propelling the Somali theater onto the global jihadist radar.”

Stratfor however notes that fighting to bring the global jihad to Somalia and basing such efforts in Somali territory is deeply unpopular, and the group has been at pains to hide their intentions under the guise of nationalism. A split with Robow, one of the more nationalist voices, and who had previously been replaced as the group’s spokesman in 2009 following his opposition to the policy of denying access to humanitarian organizations trying to help the suffering population, would not only significantly weaken Al Shabab, but also rob them of this platform.

Meanwhile, the TFG is exploiting the space created by the AMISOM deployment to deliver some services to people in Mogadishu and beyond. At the end of August, the Independent Federal Constitution Commission produced a draft constitution and submitted it to the people for consultation. The Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur, is rehabilitating roads, providing street lighting and rebuilding markets in the capital. He has recently submitted a 4 year plan for regenerating the city to our development partners, the first time this has ever been done.

The people of Mogadishu are voting with their feet, and most of the city’s 2 million people now live in areas controlled by the TFG, many having moved there to escape the ‘reign of terror’ offered by the al Shabab. Even in areas not yet under their control, the TFG is, according to Prof. Abdullahi Sheikh Ali, Minister of State for Planning and International Co-operation, working with community elders and non-governmental organisations to launch projects such as the rehabilitation of canals in Hiiran area and Middle Shabelle.

Much of this progress, though, is sadly undermined by continued political disagreements and wrangling within the government. A few weeks ago, the Prime Minister was deposed and the process of selecting a replacement has been afflicted with delays and held hostage to disputes between the President and the Speaker. However, it is instructive to note that, while regrettable, the conflicts within the TFG are being mediated through political and constitutional processes, a clear break from the past preference for violence and war.

All this has been achieved by the insertion of just 1000 extra soldiers. Imagine the impact of sending twelve times that number.

Planting Democracy, Pierre?

Undoing Business in East Africa

Despite all the self-congratulatory back slapping that greeted the release of the Doing Business in the East African Community 2010 report, the document makes for depressing reading. Though not a total solution or yardstick, the DB reports are increasingly used as a leading measure to gauge the attractiveness of a nation as a place to do business and as a measure of competitiveness. For reform-minded governments, how much their indicators improve matters more than their absolute ranking. On this score, for EAC countries and the region as a whole, it is a case of one step forward and two backwards.

Although Kenya, the region’s economic powerhouse, has instituted comprehensive licensing reforms that have led to annual private sector cost savings of $62 million, and the country is ranked 4th out of 183 nations for “ease of getting credit,” the fact that Kenya’s overall rank, measuring the ease of doing business in the country, dropped from 84 in 2009 to 95 is more significant.

Compared to 2008 when Kenya was cited as one of the world’s top ten reformers in that year’s DB Report, the country’s ranking has actually plummeted 23 places. Similarly Uganda’s overall ranking also fell from 106 in 2009 to 112 this year and Tanzania’s from 126 to 131. Burundi only marginally improved from 177 to 176.

The lone exception was Rwanda which leapt to an overall position of 67 in the 2010 rankings, up from 143 in 2009. The top reforming country in the world, the country’s efforts have paid off as it attracted some $1.1 billion in investment, 41% more than in the previous year and this in the midst of the global economic crisis which saw global FDI inflows slide by up to 44% the first quarter of 2009.

Though there is widespread expectation that integration will lower the cost of doing business, in 2009 EAC secretary general Juma Mwapachu described it as "unnecessarily too high" saying it undermined international competitiveness of the region, This is borne out by the report which observes that if each East African country were to adopt the region’s best practice the region would rank 12th rather than 116th. In other words, if the best of existing East African regulations and procedures were implemented across the board, the business environment in the region would be comparable to that in Thailand which in the first quarter of 2009 alone garnered more than $2 billion dollars in investment, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developments World Investment Report 2009.

The fact that needed reforms are in place in some but not all EAC countries inevitably calls into question the effectiveness of the regional integration experiment. In fact, though regional integration has long been touted as necessary for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, the fact is Africa remains one of the most protectionist areas in the world. With 14 landlocked countries, only 10 percent of African exports are intraregional, according to the World Trade Organization. In contrast, intraregional trade in Western Europe, is 68 percent and in Asia hovers around 40%.

Under the EAC, the five countries have officially formed a free trade area and a customs union. The common market protocol, the next step on the route to full economic integration, is set to go into effect in less than a month’s time. It will supposedly allow the free migration of businesses and people across borders as the bloc prepares to move to a common currency by 2015. However, according to the Director General, EAC customs and Trade Directorate, Mr. Peter Kiguta, despite the successful elimination of internal tariffs among Partner States and consequent growth of intra-regional trade, the ratio to total volume of trade in EAC is still a paltry 13%. “We produce what we don’t consume and we consume what we don’t produce,” as President Jakaya M. Kikwete of Tanzania said recently in Dar es Salaam at the World Economic Forum on Africa.

Mutual suspicion between partner states may be to blame for this state of affairs. According to Nation Media Group CEO, Linus Gitahi, “it is much easier for a Chinese company to get licensed to do business in any of the East Africa countries than it is for any local companies moving across the borders. Many in government have what President Yoweri Museveni calls the ‘pygmy syndrome’-the idea that you are bigger than me and by supporting you, you will get bigger and bully me.”

The EAC states may have made strides in improving literacy, fighting AIDS and improving infrastructure but when it comes to governance, the parochial nature of the region’s politics has limited gains. Little is done to curb rampant corruption. Comparing EAC country rankings in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2009 to those from the previous year reveals that the problem either worsened or stagnated in all EAC countries except Rwanda, which registered a significant improvement.

Violence, intimidation and disputed results continue to be a feature of elections. In Burundi, whose abysmal ranking in the DB 2010 Report is reflected in a report by the African Development Bank which says the country “investment, production and commerce in the country are hindered by the political and institutional environment,” opposition parties have recently demanded a repeat of communal elections, alleging massive fraud and poll-rigging. Just last week, their candidates announced their withdrawal from this month’s presidential election. Kenya’s decline has been blamed on the post-election violence and creation of a coalition government, which slowed decision-making at a time when over 70% of the countries in the world are actively reforming.

The Global Competitiveness Index identifies 3 stages of economic development, the first driven by primary factors, such as unskilled labor and natural resources, and the others marked by increases in efficiency and innovation. The EAC region is firmly rooted in the baby-stage. To be competitive, EAC states must, in addition to improving infrastructure and creating a healthy and literate workforce, focus on developing well-functioning public institutions and a stable macroeconomic framework.