Why The KDF Lion Must Learn To Speak

Until the lion learns to speak, the tale of the hunt will always glorify the hunter. The truth of this statement is today being demonstrated in the aftermath of the devastating attack by the Al Shabaab terror group on the AMISOM base at El Adde in southern Somalia.

With over Kenyan 100 troops feared dead, this is turning out to be not just a tactical victory, but a propaganda coup as well for the Al Qaeda linked militants. Panicked Generals in both AMISOM and the KDF have effectively shut down their public communications, effectively handing the airwaves to the enemy. And Al Shabaab has not been slow to exploit this opportunity. For nearly a week its tale of the hunt has been propagated around the world pretty much unchallenged.

The modern media operation is a 24-hour beast that needs to be fed round the clock. National and international mass media is the most important disseminator of news for the vast majority of people and what it carries shapes opinions and influences decisions. It is for this reason that terrorists make every effort to maximize coverage of their attacks.

And perceptions do matter. Especially in war, which the great Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz described as “the continuation of politics by other means.” Politics, as is readily apparent, is a game of perceptions and opinions. To a great extent, wars are too. They end when the losing side acknowledges it cannot win (except on the rare occasion when it is entirely eliminated).

So war itself can be seen a great communications effort, albeit one where the message is transmitted via bombs and bullets. Sun Tzu’s advice that “victorious warriors win first and then go to war” can be paraphrased thus: “Win first, then go tell your opponent about it.”

In today’s world, the fight against the terrorists is not only waged on the ground, but on newspaper pages, TV and radio broadcasts and on internet as well. This is especially true of the struggle against Al Shabaab.

Most Kenyans tend to mistakenly think of the group as a rag-tag militia with little in the way of effective organisation. In reality, Al Shabaab is well organized and resourced, and what it lacks in tanks and armour it makes up in communications capabilities.  It has established a media department which is adept at producing slick propaganda videos and churning out pictures and footage to feed the media beast with its version of events.

Now, it is true that wars are not won by press releases. But it would be a great mistake to conclude that effective communications don’t matter. In its first three years, AMISOM struggled to find its voice. Its tale was told by others, including by its enemies and detractors. As a result, it struggled to convince Somalians of its intentions, to get countries to deploy troops and to articulate its need for more and better equipment. By 2010, there was talk of “constructive disengagement” and winding up the “failing mission”.

It was in recognition of this, and at the request of the AU, that in 2009 the UN provided AMISOM with a team of civilian communications consultants as part of a wider logistical support package. I was a part of this team, which is based in Mogadishu, for nearly four years and witnessed fist-hand how well-executed communications strategies made AMISOM more effective on the ground.

From countering Al Shabaab propaganda to explaining its mandate and operations to a sceptical international audience to communicating successes on the ground, AMISOM became more adept at influencing local and international perceptions and managed to turn its reputation around. By the end of 2012 this effort- combined with the success its troops delivered on the ground- had countries competing to contribute troops and the UN Security Council voting to beef up its support for the Mission.

One of the many important lessons I learnt is that to compete effectively in the media arena, one has to be fast, first and provide accurate facts. Even, and perhaps especially, when it was bad news, you would rather the public heard it from you and not from the other side. It is a race to get your side of the story out first and to control the narrative. Another lesson was the critical need always to preserve your credibility by never putting out information that one knows to false.

On both these counts, the Kenyan Government has performed poorly. AMISOM has a long standing policy of letting its troop contributing countries speak on casualties and so its silence is somewhat understandable. The Kenyan state and its defence forces, on the other hand, has worked to prevent any details on the operation leaking out, including by prosecuting people who forwarded purported pictures of the dead Kenyan soldiers issued by Al Shabaab. It has also now provided a provisional version of events via the Chief of Defence Forces, Gen Samson Mwathethe, elements of which not only contradict its earlier statements, but also fly in the face of the few facts that have already been established.

This sadly fits into pattern that the Government has followed whenever confronted with failure. It has done little to shore up its credibility in speaking on matters security since the Westgate disaster. It has tried to impose its “Official Truth” and refused to address any holes in yarn that it has spun. More than two years later, there has been no credible official account of what happened inside that mall for four days. It is a curious position for a government famous for its formidable public relations machine to be in.

Regardless, it is clear that we can ill afford to cede the media space to Al Shabaab without a fight. Our lion must learn to speak.

El Adde Shows How Not To Fight Al Shabaab

In the wake of the Al Shabaab attack on a base manned by the Kenyan contingent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the south Somalia town of El Adde, many of our returning soldiers, as well as the many who died, are being hailed as heroes. On social and mainstream media it has become de rigueur to declare love for the Kenya Defence Forces, to hail their bravery and martyrdom. Questioning the details of the incident only invites appeals to national mourning or accusations of spitting on their sacrifice.

Yet the questions must be asked. If, as seems likely, reports of tens, perhaps over a hundred killed turn out to be true, it would be the highest one-day toll both the KDF and AMISOM have suffered in their history. It would also demonstrate that reports of Al Shabaab’s imminent demise may be greatly exaggerated. The immediate as well as wider reasons for both the catastrophe and for Al Shabaab’s ability to inflict such pain must be explored if we wish to prevent similar disasters in the future.

The facts of what happened at El Adde should give us all pause for thought. Newly deployed and inexperienced troops came under attack, their camp was overrun, their commander captured and the soldiers scattered to the wind in disarray. Many died, others fled to the bush or requested shelter from local civilians, from where we are now trying to recover them. This is not how we should be fighting our wars.

Especially worrisome is the fact this attack did not come out of the blue.

The troops in El Adde had only been there for two weeks, many coming fresh from their base in Eldoret. Al Shabaab have been known to attack AMISOM positions immediately after troop rotations, knowing that AMISOM’s practice of replacing units of experienced soldiers with entirely fresh soldiers guarantees they would face inexperienced opposition.

Further, despite losing much of the territory it once controlled across Southern Somalia, the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group has shown time and again that it remains capable of mounting devastating attacks across the country.  Of late, the group has developed an appetite for taking on AMISOM’s Forward Operating Bases.

The El Adde attack was the third such attack in the last seven months. Over 50 Burundian AMISOM soldiers were reported to have been killed when the group overran their base at Leego, 62 miles north-west of Mogadishu. Then four months ago, they sacked the Ugandan contingent’s base in Janale, again killing at least 19 soldiers, though media quoted a briefing note sent to diplomats by Western military officials claiming that around 100 soldiers were "unaccounted for" after the attack.

The tactics Al Shabaab has employed across the last two assaults are also remarkably similar to those used in the El Adde attack, both coming immediately after troop rotations and involving use of suicide car bombs and large swarms of fighters to overwhelm resistance.

Even more damning are the reports that the El Adde attack was widely anticipated and that locals had left their homes in advance of it. It is curious that little has been said about the Somali National Army troops that were co-located with the AMISOM troops. They appear to have not taken part in the fighting which probably means that they too had evacuated the area in advance of the attack. The reports indicate that this information may even have been shared with the Kenyans!

Further, the obviously poor state of relations and distrust between the Kenyan contingent and local people is another source of concern. Somalia’s fractious clan divides are a dangerous minefield that would be peacekeepers must navigate carefully. The KDF’ support for Ahmed Madobe in Kismayo has inevitably earned Kenya the suspicion, if not hostility, of clans rivalling the Ogadeni, including the Marehan who dominate El Adde.

All this is most troubling. There is a clear and massive failure of leadership which left our troops at the mercy of our enemies and that should not be swept under the carpet of a jingoistic patriotism. Once the current search and rescue operations are done, we must set up an inquiry, learn lessons and hold senior officers to account. We failed to do this following similar KDF failures at Westgate and at the Garissa University and are once again paying the price for it in blood.

The above also invites a serious debate about Kenya’s and AMISOM’s objectives in Somalia and what it will actually take to achieve them.

Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in October 2011 was in response to a spate of kidnappings for ransom by Somalia-based bandit gangs which threatened the lucrative tourist industry. Although the goals of Operation Linda Nchi were not well articulated at the time, at the very least it was meant to make the country safe for tourism. By that measure, the invasion was a spectacular failure. In the time since the invasion, attacks by Al Shabaab (which by the way had denied responsibility for the kidnappings but was targeted by the KDF anyway) on the Kenyan homeland multiplied exponentially, almost obliterating the tourism Linda Nchi was meant to save.

Today, little is heard about this. This is because Linda Nchi was hurriedly would up and the Kenya forces in Somalia rehatted as AMISOM less than a year later. They thus acquired a different set of objectives. AMISOM is a peace support mission mandated to help restore the Somalia National Security Forces, fight Al Shabaab and help extend the writ of the government in Mogadishu. It does not exist to secure Kenya.

However, it is true that a stable Somalia would be a boon for security across the region and there is no doubt Kenya would be a major beneficiary. It is important then, as a contributor to AMISOM, that Kenyans examine how that effort is doing.

On the surface, there is reason for hope. Since 2011, as noted above, Al Shabaab has been pushed out of nearly all of Somalia’s major towns including all the ports it once controlled. But while the terror group has been degraded, the authority of the Federal Government does not extend much outside the towns and Al Shabaab is still able to operate freely in much of rural south Somalia. Further, as the El Adde attack demonstrates, the Somali forces are far from ready to take on Al Shabaab.

This has critical implications for AMISOM. Its exit strategy is predicated not just on sufficiently degrading Al Shabaab, but also on training up effective Somali troops. The latter’s continued weakness is a double blow to AMISOM. Firstly, it delays the date of an eventual AMISOM exit. Secondly, one of the reasons for the UN Security Council authorising relatively low troop numbers for AMISOM was the expectation that the SNA would fill the gap. The UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) – the second phase of the initial UN intervention, from March 1993 to March 1995 – had a similar mandate to AMISOM and had 30,000 troops. AMISOM has just over 22,000 and for much of its time Somalia has had much less.

The Mission also lacks crucial equipment and support enablers. Although belatedly authorised by the Security Council in 2012, helicopters are yet to arrive in the Mission area. Thus despite the successes it has achieved, there remain serious questions as to whether AMISOM, as currently constituted, can fully deliver on its mandate.

These and other issues should form the basis of an informed public debate on the wisdom and objectives of the KDF deployment in Somalia.  There is an opportunity today for Kenya to begin to seriously examine the options it has in Somalia and for the Kenyan public to finally have an informed say on what course to follow.

Why Kenya Is Not At War

A version of this article was published by Aljazeera Online.

Kenya is at war. This mantra is repeated over and over ad infinitum by government officials and pro-establishment types. At a time of military conflict, we are told, peacetime rules and conventions do not apply and we should be prepared to give up some of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. But really, are we at war?

“We are in a war against terrorists in and outside our country,” declared President Uhuru Kenyatta in December. He was, of course, referring to the confrontation with the extremist and murderous terror group, Al Shabaab, which has killed hundreds of Kenyans in the last 4 years. Most of these deaths have come in the wake of the October 2011 invasion of Somalia, whose goal was initially proclaimed to be the pursuit of kidnappers and to push Al Shabaab away from our borders.

Despite the banner headlines at the time, there was no official declaration of war, either against Somalia or against Al Shabaab. In fact, there has since been no such declaration, which according to the constitution would have required the authorisation of Parliament.

But if Kenya is not exactly a de jure state at war, is it in a de facto state of war? There is no doubt, as the President has noted, that “our country and our people are under attack”. Since 2012, more than 600 people have been killed by the Al Shabaab, who continue to threaten to paint Kenyan cities red with blood.

However, it is far from clear that the country’s response to the terrorists could reasonably be characterized as a military conflict. The troops in Somalia, who neither caught up with the kidnappers nor succeeded in pushing Al Shabaab from our borders, quickly shifted goal posts and declared their objective to be the capture of the Somali port of Kismayo, which was achieved a year later. By then, the troops had been rehatted as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia and were, at least nominally, taking their orders from the Force Commander in Mogadishu and not the Ministry of Defence in Nairobi. Today, with a battalion having been withdrawn to make way for Sierra Leone, under 4000 troops remain in AMISOM.

Although the Kenya Defence Forces are today routinely deployed within Kenya, it is not always or even predominantly fighting against the Al Shabaab. In fact, in many instances, it has been deployed to quell internecine conflict between Kenyan communities. If deploying the KDF is an act of war, then Kenya is as much at war with itself as it is with Al Shabaab.

In truth, the battle against Al Shabaab has been much more a policing than a military action, though it is frequently described, as I have just done, in language from the latter. As a matter of fact, on two occasions –at Westgate where 68 people were slaughtered and most recently in Garissa where at least 148 perished- the deployment of the KDF to do a job the specialized police unit known as Recce Company should have been doing, was cited as a major failure. Reports on other terrorist incidents such as the June 2014 Mpeketoni attacks which left about 70 dead, mainly blamed problems within the police service not the military, from divided command to corruption, for poor responses.

In Somalia too, Kenya is not prosecuting a war against the Al Shabaab in Somalia. AMISOM, where Kenya is one of several principals, is. AMISOM’s objective is not, at least directly, to protect the Kenyan border, but rather to support and protect the government in Mogadishu. Sure AMISOM is mandated to eliminate Al Shabaab. But given the reports of the Kenyan contingent’s involvement in illicit trade that benefits Al Shabaab immensely such as the smuggling of charcoal and sugar, it is debatable whether they are particularly focussed on this objective.

Kenya is at war in the sense Australia or Canada are at war. Both nations have deployed troops abroad to fight as part of a coalition confronting extremists. Both have suffered terror attacks, though nowhere near what Kenya has experienced. Most would immediately see the incongruity of suggesting that Canadians and Australian accept "wartime" restrictions on their liberties (which is not to say such restriction is not attempted). But Kenya, with its much greater familiarity with terrorist attack is an easier target for the argument.

In the 1997 Barry Levinson movie, Wag The Dog, the US administration fabricates a war with Albania to distract the public from a sex scandal on the eve of an presidential election. Similarly, in Kenya today, the talk of war is intended to mask a multitude of sins on the part of the government and security agents. It is thus not unusual for officials to assert “operational security” to avoid public scrutiny. Or to hear that, as one commentator tweeted, “it is incongruous [to] deem it practical that counter-terrorist activities [be] governed by peacetime procedures/rules.”

The idea of a literal war on terrorism, and opposed to the figurative “wars” on corruption and drugs, is meant to generate a climate of fear and foster an unthinking and unquestioning patriotism. It is not only the carpet under which government seeks to sweep its failure to fundamentally reform and fix the country’s security system, but also provides justification for a clampdown on dissent.

Andrew Franklin, a Nairobi-based security analyst, notes: “Kenya is not at war. As archaic as it may sound, wars are declared and fought between states or coalitions of states. This is not mere sophistry since declarations of war justify extraordinary – and temporary – restrictions on all manner of normal domestic activities and curbs on many constitutionally protected freedoms. 

“This is why going to war is considered a big deal and not just a matter of semantics.”

Fighting Words

The recent kidnappings of two disabled Europeans from the Kenyan coastal resort town of Lamu have brought to the fore concerns about the spill-over effects of continued anarchy in neighbouring Somalia. For much of the last 20 years, Kenya has had to contend with huge flows of refugees and illegal arms into its territory as well as conflict along the common border which have rendered the North Eastern province essentially ungovernable. The terrorist attacks of 1998 and 2002 in Nairobi and Kikambala were both planned from within Somalia and, more recently, piracy off the vast Somali coast and now the spate of kidnappings for ransom by Somalia-based bandit gangs are posing significant threats to the Kenyan economy. This raises the question of what the country is doing to address these threats.

Two weeks ago, while addressing a Mini-Summit on Somalia that was held at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, President Mwai Kibaki called on the international community to expand its support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was deployed in Mogadishu in 2007 under a UN mandate to help support the Somali peace process and protect the institutions that the process had generated. However, while thanking “Uganda and Burundi for their continued unwavering commitment in providing the AMISOM troops”,” the President did not explain why Kenya itself has not contributed troops to the mission.

The Kenyan reluctance can be partly explained by the fear that a peaceful, confident and secure Somalia may once more stoke irredentist ambitions among the Kenya’s Somali population as it did in the years immediately before and following independence, leading to the “Shifta War” of 1963-67. However, this fear ignores the fact that in the last 20 years, as Somalia dissolved into chaos, much has been done on the Kenyan side of the border to integrate the Somali population into the rest of the country. The harsh policy of emergency rule by decree was lifted in 1992 and, in a 2005 report, Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Associate Professor of political science at Davidson College and a former special advisor to the U.N. operation in Somalia, noted that “the introduction of competitive elections for Parliament has had the positive effect of opening up political space for debate in the region, and of generating legislative representatives seeking to serve the interests of their home constituencies.” Today, ethnic Somalis hold high positions in the Kenyan political and business landscape. Compare that with the situation 30 years prior, when a British commission of inquiry reported that 87 per cent ot the population in what was then known as the Northern Frontier District, favoured unification with Somalia and subsequently boycotted the 1963 elections in favour of armed insurrection.

While undoubtedly much more remains to be done to extend the benefits of Kenyan citizenship, including government services such as registration, security and infrastructure, as well as investment and economic opportunities to the North Eastern Province, it is clear that the fear of irredentism is a historical relic that should not stand in the way of stabilizing Somalia.

The fact is Kenya has been an instrumental actor in the search for peace in the Horn of Africa. Its facilitation enabled rival Somali groups to negotiate and develop the transitional structures at several conferences hosted in Kenyan towns. In fact, the Transitional Federal Government and Parliament were formed in Nairobi and from there, set out to establish a governmental presence first in Baidoa and then in Mogadishu. Kenya’s involvement was motivated as much by self interest, given the price it was paying for the anarchy, as by good neighbourliness.

Over the past year, the support of AMISOM has been critical in entrenching this peace process. With it, the TFG has achieved significant success in forcing the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab extremists out of Mogadishu, and establishing a measure of relative security in the Somali capital. The confidence this has engendered in the population is evidenced by the fact that many Somalis displaced by the famine ravaging the country are opting to flee to the relative safety of the sea-side city, where international agencies have been providing humanitarian aid. This undoubtedly relieves the pressures that would otherwise be brought to bear on the already overcrowded refugee camps in Daadab in Kenya. In fact, as many refugees were heading north to the capital daily, as were headed south to Daadab, and while the flow into Kenya has somewhat diminished, that into Mogadishu continues unabated.

Further, the relative peace has created room for further negotiations among Somali factions with a view to the eventual conclusion of the transition and the return of permanent government. In his speech to the UN, President Kibaki alluded to the conference held a month ago in Mogadishu, during which a detailed Roadmap to achieving this, complete with benchmarks and timelines, was adopted. It is undeniable that these achievements in the security, humanitarian and political spheres will, if entrenched and expanded, have a lasting beneficial effect on the situation along the Kenyan border.

However, as demonstrated by last week’s horrific suicide bombing in Mogadishu, this is easier said than done. As President Kibaki noted, AMISOM urgently needs to be reinforced so that the city can be secured and the war taken to the extremists in the southern areas, where the famine has hit hardest and where criminal gangs benefit from the al Shabaab’s protection. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has already authorised the deployment of up to 20,000 AMISOM troops, which is what the field commanders say is necessary to secure the whole country. Further, the UN Security Council has committed to review the AU request for expanded support but pegged it to an increase in troops to the already authorised 12000, up from the current 9,000 now in Mogadishu.

It is up to African countries to make up the numbers. While encouraging noises have been heard from Sierra Leone and Djibouti with regards to deployments (the former have promised a battalion by April next year while the latter have also declared their intentions to send troops), nothing in this regard has been heard from the Kenyans. Yet with one of the more advanced and better equipped militaries in the region and the strongest economy to boot, Kenya would be a valuable addition to AMISOM.

The fact is, whether it likes it or not, the Kenyan military is likely to be increasingly drawn into a confrontation with the extremists on its North-Eastern frontier. The question is whether this will take the form of a unilateral, protracted, low-level conflict on the border or whether Kenya will join the AU forces in Mogadishu working for a holistic solution. In the final analysis, a strong Somali state, able to enforce its writ across the whole of the country’s territory, would be a boon to the fight against piracy, terrorism and radicalisation within the region as well as a reliable partner in combating cross-border crime.

In conclusion, just as the fight against piracy cannot be resolved by policing the high seas, so the pacification of the North Eastern border is not to be achieved through creation of buffer entities along the border or declarations of war against small gangs of bandits intent on kidnapping elderly, disabled pensioners in speedboats. The real and lasting solution lies in the pacification of Somalia through support for the peace and reconciliation process and the reconstitution of an effective, representative and democratic administration in Mogadishu. The participation of Kenya in this endeavour, utilising its considerable diplomatic, economic and, yes, military muscle, will not only expedite this outcome, but also ensure that its economic interests as well as the safety of its tourists are secured in the long term.

Somalia: Mission Possible

Two weeks ago, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council recommended that the mandated strength of its peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) be raised from 8000 to 20,000 troops. It also called on the international community to blockade Somali ports and enforce a no-fly zone over the country to interdict resupply for Islamist rebels fighting to overthrow the internationally recognized government.

As the UN mulls over this proposal, events on the ground continue to give an indication of the effect increased troop numbers can have.

Since 2007, AU peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi have been deployed in Mogadishu under both an AU and UN mandate and at the invitation of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. Their task is to support the decade-long Somali peace process and the transitional institutions it has generated.

For much of this time, AMISOM has been seriously under-resourced and undermanned. Nonetheless, the troops succeeded in their foremost task of protecting the Transitional Federal Government from Al Qaida liked extremist groups who have foresworn the peace process. In July, however, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development resolved to send a further 2000 troops, bringing the AU mission to its mandated strength of 8000. By mid-August, half of the IGAD troops had been inserted into Mogadishu and the effect have been quick and dramatic.

In June, the TFG controlled just 5 districts in the capital. Now, with the support of the IGAD reinforcements the TFG has managed to gain ground and now controls nearly half of the capital’s 16 districts. The gains are all the more remarkable considering that they were made in the face of a so-called “terminal offensive” launched by the extremist group, Al Shabab during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

These successes have provided a springboard for the TFG to launch its long-awaited offensive to retake the rest of the country. Last week, the TFG and its allies captured Beled-Hawo, a southwestern Somali town near the Kenyan border, deep in the heart of al Shabaab territory - a huge blow to the insurgents’ image of invincibility. Government forces are now at the doorstep of the strategically important town of Beled weyne, Hiiraan’s regional capital, threatening the insurgents’ grip over South and Central Somalia.

The losses suffered by the insurgents have amplified clan divisions and disputes over command, the policy of denying access to humanitarian organizations trying to help the suffering population in Central and South Somalia, and the role of foreign fighters. According to the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington think tank that monitors global security, the failure of the Ramadan offensive, led to “a major rift between Al Shabab’s emir, Sheikh Ahmad Abdi Godane and his deputy, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow.”

This is significant because, as US global security consultancy, Stratfor, says, it represents a split between the group’s nationalist and internationalist elements. According to Stratfor, Godane “is considered the leader of the internationalist elements, coordinating closely with foreign jihadists from al Qaeda who have joined its ranks over the last few years,” and is “responsible for propelling the Somali theater onto the global jihadist radar.”

Stratfor however notes that fighting to bring the global jihad to Somalia and basing such efforts in Somali territory is deeply unpopular, and the group has been at pains to hide their intentions under the guise of nationalism. A split with Robow, one of the more nationalist voices, and who had previously been replaced as the group’s spokesman in 2009 following his opposition to the policy of denying access to humanitarian organizations trying to help the suffering population, would not only significantly weaken Al Shabab, but also rob them of this platform.

Meanwhile, the TFG is exploiting the space created by the AMISOM deployment to deliver some services to people in Mogadishu and beyond. At the end of August, the Independent Federal Constitution Commission produced a draft constitution and submitted it to the people for consultation. The Mayor of Mogadishu, Mohamed Nur, is rehabilitating roads, providing street lighting and rebuilding markets in the capital. He has recently submitted a 4 year plan for regenerating the city to our development partners, the first time this has ever been done.

The people of Mogadishu are voting with their feet, and most of the city’s 2 million people now live in areas controlled by the TFG, many having moved there to escape the ‘reign of terror’ offered by the al Shabab. Even in areas not yet under their control, the TFG is, according to Prof. Abdullahi Sheikh Ali, Minister of State for Planning and International Co-operation, working with community elders and non-governmental organisations to launch projects such as the rehabilitation of canals in Hiiran area and Middle Shabelle.

Much of this progress, though, is sadly undermined by continued political disagreements and wrangling within the government. A few weeks ago, the Prime Minister was deposed and the process of selecting a replacement has been afflicted with delays and held hostage to disputes between the President and the Speaker. However, it is instructive to note that, while regrettable, the conflicts within the TFG are being mediated through political and constitutional processes, a clear break from the past preference for violence and war.

All this has been achieved by the insertion of just 1000 extra soldiers. Imagine the impact of sending twelve times that number.

AMISOM Expands Bases as Shabaab Offensive Fizzles

The view from an Amisom position overlooking a busy intersection at Kilometre 4 in Mogadishu. Civilian lfe is slowly returning to normal in areas under the peacekeepers control

By Patrick Gathara
Nairobi, September 15 2010

The “terminal” Ramadan offensive by Al Shabab, the extremist group fighting to overthrow Somalia’s internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government and impose an extreme form of Islamic law, seems to have run out of steam. Barely three weeks after declaring they would drive AU peacekeepers out Somalia and erase the TFG presence, the militants top command have reportedly gathered in Baidoa to review their Ramadan operations amid reports of mass desertions and huge complaints from the populace as fighters are returned to their villages scarred, injured or dead. All indications point to complete disarray within the extremists ranks, dwindling public support and an inability to decide on their next course of action.

Unable to dislodge the peacekeepers, the Al Qaida-aligned extremists, under the tutelage of foreign fighters, have turned on the civilian population. On August 24, militants wearing Somali military uniforms stormed Muna hotel in Mogadishu, firing indiscriminately and killing close to 40 people, including six parliamentarians. A day later, a roadside bomb killed 15 people, including several school children. Just last week, a suicide attack on the Aden Ade International Airport claimed the lives of 9.

The militants’ tactics are increasingly alienating them from the local population. A sign of their desperation came this week when a spokesman for the militants reportedly went on radio to appeal for public support, money, food and even blood donations. The call came as reports emerged of a crowd walking out of a Mosque in protest at the Mullah's support for the Shabab. Other reports have pointed to civilians leaving areas under Shabab control and streaming into those under the TFG and AMISOM where they can access medical attention and humanitarian aid. AMISOM already distributes 1.8 million litres of clean drinking water to civilians living near its bases in addition to providing them with free medical services at its hospital and outpatient clinics.

Following the failure of the offensive, sources at AMISOM say, the Shabab are probably at the weakest they have been since 2006, having taken hundreds of casualties while achieving little in terms of strategic gains. However, the AU peacekeepers, hamstrung by a restrictive mandate and a shortage of troops, are unable to capitalize on this to push the extremists out of the city altogether.

The 7000-strong AMISOM force has been in Somalia since 2007 in support of the decade-old peace process and the government generated by it. For most of that time, despite being undermanned and underequipped, they have successfully held of repeated attacks by the Islamist rebels. The troops, drawn from Uganda and Burundi, are only authorized to fire in self-defense and in defense of critical infrastructure and civilians.
During Ramadan, the AU peacekeepers, working closely with Somali government forces, managed to secure key positions and civilian areas in the Somali capital. One company from the Burundi contingent recently deployed to Hoshi, which guards the south-western route into the city, in support of Transitional Federal Government troops there who had come under attack from the Shabab. The location is critical to securing the neighbourhood of Medina, and also serves to extend the defenses of the Mogadishu National University campus where the contingent has its main base.

Col. Aloys Sindayihebura, the Deputy Burundi Contingent Commander, and Col. Agi, a senior TFG commander, accompanied journalists on a tour of the base, which basically comprises two compounds on either side of Kabka road, one of the city’s main arteries and a crucial supply route.

Addressing the reporters, the two officers were candid about the challenges facing the fledgling Somali army and the need for continued AMISOM support. The TFG, said Col. Agi, had problems paying salaries and providing meals to his troops. He acknowledged that this was having an adverse effect on recruitment. “Some of my soldiers have gone nearly 5 months without pay,” he said.

In addition to Hoshi and the University, the Burundi contingent has 4 other bases along Kabka road covering the area between Madina and Gaashandiga, including one at the Siad Barre Military Academy. Burundi soldiers are also deployed in two bases at Al Jazeera, guarding the southern approach to the Aden Ade International Airport, where the main AMISOM Force Headquarters are located.

Kilometre 4, a public square in the city, is now a hive of bustling activity as people go about their business free from the fear of insurgent attack. This followed the opening of a new AMISOM base at Coca Cola village, just a day into the militant’s offensive. Giving journalists a tour of the new position, the commander of the Ugandan contingent, Col. Michael Ondoga, said the base was necessary to reinforce weaker TFG positions and to deny the militants mortar range. Prior to that, al-Shabab attacks had killed 7 people at K4, including 6 at a nearby camp for the displaced.

At another outpost bordering the northern district of Bondere, AMISOM troops are sandwiched between Villa Somalia, the seat of the Transitional Federal Government, and al Shabab positions to the north and east. The hilltop encampment is on territory formerly used by the Shabab to shell the Presidential Palace and surrounding civilian areas. It was taken on July 21 following three days of heavy fighting which cost the lives of 2 AMISOM troops and those of over 70 Shabab fighters.