Sitting Down With The Devil

Kigali is impressive. From its clean streets and new buildings to the ubiquitous sense of safety and order, it is today hailed as a model for capital cities across the continent. Similarly hailed is the Rwandan government, which has transformed the country, phoenix-like, from the ashes of the 1994 genocide into the rising star of Africa.

Last week, a network of bloggers on the continent, of which I am a part, was invited to a brainstorming session in Kigali over how to engage in policy discourses with governments on the subject of supporting digitally-driven innovation across the continent. The Rwandan state has set itself up as a driving force in the field, with its President, Paul Kagame, chairing the board of Smart Africa, which seeks to “accelerate socio-economic development through information and communications technologies”.

Many of the young, globe-trotting, idealistic individuals I met in these sessions were passionate about the possibilities offered by ICT and the need to engage governments in the effort. However, while I did not doubt their sincerity, what I found disturbing was the seeming blindness to the dangers such engagement may pose.

At about the same time, 750km to the east, yet another State House Summit was getting underway in Nairobi. According to press reports, President Uhuru Kenyatta had invited his administration’s “harshest critics” to a televised pow-wow over corruption. Two specified critics -John Githongo and David Ndii- did not honor the summons earning themselves a Presidential rebuke and much ridicule from ruling party supporters. But I think the two experienced hands had seen something that my friends in Kigali seemed unwilling to acknowledge: that “engagement” is a two-way street. 

In Kenya, as Ndii noted in an article explaining his absence, the problem is neither that government is unaware of corruption nor that it is ignorant of the questions raised about its custody of public finances. Its own agencies have documented much of this. The real problem is the lack of will within the governing elite which perpetrates the looting to do something about it. There is no appetite not just to prosecute friends and political allies, but more fundamentally, to restructure the state to eliminate the opportunities and impunity that incentivize graft.

In such an environment, the State House “engagements” would be of limited utility for those demanding reform and accountability while gifting the government a massive propaganda opportunity to burnish its anti-corruption credentials. In the end, the absence of Githongo and Ndii forced the spotlight back on the government’s lack of action rather than on its rhetoric, which dissolved in a flurry of buck-passing led by the responsibility-ducking Commander-In-Chief, himself. #CryBabyPresident was how Kenyans on Twitter summarized it.

In Kigali, there seemed little understanding that the problems of poverty on the continent do not spring from a lack of knowledge or innovation but rather from a lack of accountability and democracy. The poor Africans my friends sought to help were largely impoverished by the very governments they sought to engage; who were stealing from them, fueling the conflicts that displaced them and denying them a say in decisions affecting their lives. Apart from Kagame, the Smart Africa Board is peopled by such luminaries as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Gabon’s Ali Bongo, South Sudan’s Salva Kiir, Chad’s Idriss Deby, and, of course, Kenya’s Uhuru.

Engagement with such a gang risks affording them an opportunity to hide their sins under the carpet of innovation and broadband access. It risks moving the spotlight away from what they are actually doing to their own citizens and focusing it on their rhetoric of progress and inclusion. It is why, when addressing the meeting in Kigali, Jean Nsengimana, Rwanda’s Minister for Youth and ICT, could bemoan the fact that the continent was not creating billion-dollar “Unicorns” while ignoring that it was very proficient at creating billion-dollar politicians.

In fact, all the talk of transforming communities and making them smarter and more innovative seems to completely elide the fact that it is governments and the states they serve that require transformation. There is little talk of who actually benefits from the ICT Hubs and events established and held across the continent, most in the wealthier parts of capital cities.

And speaking of capital cities, with all its impressive progressive, it is easy to miss what Kigali hides. The unspoken conversations, the disappearances and assassinations, the rounding up of street families so visiting potentates can enjoy a view unblemished by evidence of failure. Yes, Kigali is safe, but safe for whom? Yes, it is clean, but clean for whom? Yes, it works, but works for whom?

These are questions any who purport to be interested in the welfare of the continent’s people, rather than that of “Africa” must be willing to engage with. And while the answers may not necessarily preclude engagement with governments, they will certainly allow us to choose forums that are more likely to deliver real action and change for the people rather than a megaphone for their governments.   

Dictating Democracy?

Undoing Business in East Africa

Despite all the self-congratulatory back slapping that greeted the release of the Doing Business in the East African Community 2010 report, the document makes for depressing reading. Though not a total solution or yardstick, the DB reports are increasingly used as a leading measure to gauge the attractiveness of a nation as a place to do business and as a measure of competitiveness. For reform-minded governments, how much their indicators improve matters more than their absolute ranking. On this score, for EAC countries and the region as a whole, it is a case of one step forward and two backwards.

Although Kenya, the region’s economic powerhouse, has instituted comprehensive licensing reforms that have led to annual private sector cost savings of $62 million, and the country is ranked 4th out of 183 nations for “ease of getting credit,” the fact that Kenya’s overall rank, measuring the ease of doing business in the country, dropped from 84 in 2009 to 95 is more significant.

Compared to 2008 when Kenya was cited as one of the world’s top ten reformers in that year’s DB Report, the country’s ranking has actually plummeted 23 places. Similarly Uganda’s overall ranking also fell from 106 in 2009 to 112 this year and Tanzania’s from 126 to 131. Burundi only marginally improved from 177 to 176.

The lone exception was Rwanda which leapt to an overall position of 67 in the 2010 rankings, up from 143 in 2009. The top reforming country in the world, the country’s efforts have paid off as it attracted some $1.1 billion in investment, 41% more than in the previous year and this in the midst of the global economic crisis which saw global FDI inflows slide by up to 44% the first quarter of 2009.

Though there is widespread expectation that integration will lower the cost of doing business, in 2009 EAC secretary general Juma Mwapachu described it as "unnecessarily too high" saying it undermined international competitiveness of the region, This is borne out by the report which observes that if each East African country were to adopt the region’s best practice the region would rank 12th rather than 116th. In other words, if the best of existing East African regulations and procedures were implemented across the board, the business environment in the region would be comparable to that in Thailand which in the first quarter of 2009 alone garnered more than $2 billion dollars in investment, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developments World Investment Report 2009.

The fact that needed reforms are in place in some but not all EAC countries inevitably calls into question the effectiveness of the regional integration experiment. In fact, though regional integration has long been touted as necessary for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, the fact is Africa remains one of the most protectionist areas in the world. With 14 landlocked countries, only 10 percent of African exports are intraregional, according to the World Trade Organization. In contrast, intraregional trade in Western Europe, is 68 percent and in Asia hovers around 40%.

Under the EAC, the five countries have officially formed a free trade area and a customs union. The common market protocol, the next step on the route to full economic integration, is set to go into effect in less than a month’s time. It will supposedly allow the free migration of businesses and people across borders as the bloc prepares to move to a common currency by 2015. However, according to the Director General, EAC customs and Trade Directorate, Mr. Peter Kiguta, despite the successful elimination of internal tariffs among Partner States and consequent growth of intra-regional trade, the ratio to total volume of trade in EAC is still a paltry 13%. “We produce what we don’t consume and we consume what we don’t produce,” as President Jakaya M. Kikwete of Tanzania said recently in Dar es Salaam at the World Economic Forum on Africa.

Mutual suspicion between partner states may be to blame for this state of affairs. According to Nation Media Group CEO, Linus Gitahi, “it is much easier for a Chinese company to get licensed to do business in any of the East Africa countries than it is for any local companies moving across the borders. Many in government have what President Yoweri Museveni calls the ‘pygmy syndrome’-the idea that you are bigger than me and by supporting you, you will get bigger and bully me.”

The EAC states may have made strides in improving literacy, fighting AIDS and improving infrastructure but when it comes to governance, the parochial nature of the region’s politics has limited gains. Little is done to curb rampant corruption. Comparing EAC country rankings in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2009 to those from the previous year reveals that the problem either worsened or stagnated in all EAC countries except Rwanda, which registered a significant improvement.

Violence, intimidation and disputed results continue to be a feature of elections. In Burundi, whose abysmal ranking in the DB 2010 Report is reflected in a report by the African Development Bank which says the country “investment, production and commerce in the country are hindered by the political and institutional environment,” opposition parties have recently demanded a repeat of communal elections, alleging massive fraud and poll-rigging. Just last week, their candidates announced their withdrawal from this month’s presidential election. Kenya’s decline has been blamed on the post-election violence and creation of a coalition government, which slowed decision-making at a time when over 70% of the countries in the world are actively reforming.

The Global Competitiveness Index identifies 3 stages of economic development, the first driven by primary factors, such as unskilled labor and natural resources, and the others marked by increases in efficiency and innovation. The EAC region is firmly rooted in the baby-stage. To be competitive, EAC states must, in addition to improving infrastructure and creating a healthy and literate workforce, focus on developing well-functioning public institutions and a stable macroeconomic framework.

War and Peace-keeping

Si vispacem, para bellum is a well-worn Latin adage that translates as, "If you wish for peace, prepare for war." However to prepare for war, one must have an idea of the likely threats as well as which to prioritise. According to the Kenyan Ministry of Defence, the two-fold mission of the country’s armed forces, as defined by the Constitution, is “to deter aggression and should deterrence fail, defend the Republic; provide support to civil power in the maintenance of order.” But what does it mean to defend the Republic?

Kenya’s National Security Intelligence Services Act defines “a threat to national security” as espionage, sabotage, terrorism or subversion directed against the country’s interests; the destruction or overthrow of the constitutionally established system of the Government; violence promotinga constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic objective or change in Kenya; and “foreign-influenced activity” that is detrimental to the interests of Kenya.

Thus the military’s mandate does not preclude its intervening in internal matters to preserve and defend the state. In fact, the prospect of military intervention is domestic matters is not new in the region. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have been host to numerous coups d’etat by the military establishment, in most cases to the detriment of society as the military administrations proved to be much worse than the civilian regimes they deposed. In fact, two of the region’s leaders, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, came to power via military force and thereafter sought to legitimize their rule through elections.

More recently, addressing an East African security meeting in October 2009, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni called for the creation of an East-African defence force to counter threats both from within and outside the region. And during Kenya’s post-election conflagration in 2008, Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, drew the wrath of the Kibaki administration when he urged the Kenyan army into action saying that he did not oppose military intervention when “institutions have lost control”. Ironically, according to the Financial Times, President Kibaki had himself considered imposing a state of emergency but the army resisted, fearing a split in their own ranks.Instead the army preferred a low-key role, distributing food and opening up blocked roads, though on at least one occasion it did step in to separate fighting mobs. According to a paper by the Kenya Human Rights Commission Executive Director, Muthoni Wanyeki, Agenda Item One of the mediation processes contemplated the possibility of preventive military deploymentto immediately end the violence.

However, in its interventions, whether internally or facing an external foe the military falls under the same limitations as described by Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute for Defence Politics in the case of the South African Defence Force. “It is part of the executive arm of the Government. It therefore does not have autonomy of action, or unlimited scope in defining its own role in society at large, except in so far as such actions or roles support, and are within the guidelines of national policy and objectives.”

A paper by Carolyne Pumphrey for the US Department of Defence states that while the traditional view of national security is that it is concerned with the preservation of state sovereignty (most especially its monopoly of force) and the protection of national interests, these interests are not confined to countries’ borders. If one compares Kenya’s territory to its ecological footprint- the amount of resources the country needs to maintain itself- the latter is far larger than the former.Therefore a threat to the country’s ability to secure supplies from without its territory, such as that posed by Somali pirates to shipping destined for Mombasa is a threat to its national security.

While the military can be seen as an instrument available to a sovereign government to provide security for its citizens and defend the nation’s vital interests, in the 21st century it may be necessary to modify this traditional approach, for more and more in today’s world protecting a way of life has moved well beyond the use of military power. According to Col. Dan Smith and Rachel Stohl of the Center for Defense Information, “interlocking if not competing political, economic, social, and environmental interests are tying together as never before the fate of sovereign states. In turn the freedoms of citizens in an ever growing number of nations are becoming intertwined in such a way that individual security is becoming increasingly linked to the achievement of security at the international level through the reciprocal implementation of policies driven by national priorities.” To paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King, insecurity anywhere is a threat to security everywhere.

Therefore, a new paradigm of security has emerged which stands the Westphalian system, and its designation of the nation-state as the focal point of security, on its head. Referred to as “human security,” it decrees that the individual (or the collection of individuals known as the nation) is supreme, and not the institutions of governance. In this conception, the military’s purpose is not the protection of the state but rather the citizen. Within this paradigm, it is easy to understand the Kenya military’s queasiness about the proposed declaration of emergency during the post-election conflict. As one person, at the time described by the Financial Times, as being close to the senior command, put it, “The question the army has been asking is, is this a legally elected government? If not, and they deploy, are they supporting a ‘civilian coup?’”

However, this should not be taken to mean that the army always behaves itself when it comes to civilians. It has been accused of systematic murder, torture and scores of other human rights abuses in its interventions to quell insurgencies in Sabaot and in the country’s restive North Eastern Province. Similarly, Uganda’s military was accused of terrorized the very civilians it was supposedly rescuing from the clutches of the psychopathic LRA.

Such tactics, which breed resentment and anger, do little to further the military objective of pacification, as the US and its allies are discovering in Iraq and Afghanistan. More and more, the talk there has moved from the macho “winning,” with its visions of tidy victories and foes who know when they are beaten, to the softer “winning hearts and minds,” which recognizes that insurgencies are not defeated by capturing cities and bridges, but by embracing the people. It is a lesson the AU is yet to learn in Somalia, where it strives to secure a feckless government instead of the suffering populace. In Iraq, the troop surge, an emphasis on capturing and holding cities instead of withdrawing to the relative safety of green zones, as well as engaging with locals bore fruit. The AU should consider doing the same in Somalia.

This does not mean that insurgencies should not be fought militarily. According to Jane’s Information Group, the terror strikes on US and Israeli targets in Kenya in 1998 and 2002 highlight the fact that the country is at risk of attack by international terrorists. The country's geographical location bordering the conflict zones of Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan has also made it vulnerable to infiltration by neighbouring rebel groups for use as a rear base or transit country. Similarly, Rwanda is threatened by former genocidaires who are also causing chaos on the other side of the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The LRA continues to make Northern Uganda and parts of the DRC ungovernable. All these threats need to be met squarely and the countries should not shy away from military confrontation if such is called for.

But, whether it is confronting Al Shebbab on Kenya’s borders or the Interhamwe on Rwanda’s, the focus of policymakers should be to extend the fruits of peace to the populations that breed and host these elements. This might mean working with the more reasonable elements of these groups, or, in the extreme, direct military intervention. It would also require that the military starts to provide security and services to the beleaguered peoples on their side of the borders to prevent them falling under the spell of armed groups.

General Sir David Ramsbotham of the British Army notes that every military operation is, in itself, a man-made disaster because “the use of force is bound to result in damage, not just to life and limb but also to national infrastructures. Having inflicted or received that damage, the military are trained, equipped and accustomed to repairing it. Furthermore, they are accustomed to functioning under the Law of Armed Conflict, so conforming with the dictate of international law is not strange to them either.” Our troops, with the experience of policing war zones on other continents, should prove no less adept at doing it at home.