In an article published on
Aljazeera, Solomon Ayele Dersso, a senior legal scholar and an analyst on
Africa and African Union affairs, avers that the lesson from Gambia for African
countries is that “not only should [the opposition and citizenry] forge unity
during elections, but also prepare to work with regional and international
bodies for a negotiated exit guaranteeing peaceful transfer of power”. This may
be true but the ouster of Yahya Jammeh also has another lesson for the
continent’s despots: accountability is
dead.
The facts speak for themselves. Jammeh lost an
election and, after initially accepting his defeat, subsequently chose to
contest it. This was a first. In all other cases of disputed elections on the
continent, the incumbent has from the very beginning declared himself winner.
The Kenyan experience following the 2007 elections as well as that of the Ivory
Coast four years later amply illustrates this.
In the respective cases, both Mwai Kibaki and Laurent
Gbagbo refused to acknowledge defeat. What ensued was violence, international
intervention (military in the case of Gbagbo) and ICC prosecutions. In Jammeh’s
case, the avoidance of accountability is now presented as a win for the
country.
The deal offered by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and the
United Nations assured the former dictator of “the kind of dignity befitting a
citizen, former president and party leader”-shorthand for immunity from
prosecution- and allowed him to keep the loot from his 22 years in power
(presumably including the $11 million withdrawn from state coffers in his last two weeks in power).
This is the problem with the Gambia transition. It is
not a case of the incumbent losing power and gracefully handing over power.
Rather, it is the legitimization of the idea that heads of state who lose power
can use their incumbency, and the implicit threat of violence, as a bargaining
chip to escape accountability for crimes committed during their tenure.
This runs counter to the tenets of democracy. Giving
up power once an election is lost should not be perceived as a particularly
heroic act. It should rather be an inevitable consequence of the withdrawal of
popular consent. There should be no requirement for quid pro quos, negotiations
or international interventions.
Transfer of power in a democracy, as former Czech
President and playwright, Vaclav Havel noted, should be mundane in a democracy.
However, in the case of African countries, it is portrayed as an act of
benevolence. When then Kenyan strongman Daniel arap Moi accepted the loss of
his chosen successor or “project” (current President Uhuru Kenyatta), he was
hailed as a statesman. Yet he should have never had a choice in the matter.
Similarly, Yahya Jammeh should not have been allowed to think he somehow “deserved”
a dignified exit. That was up to the Gambian people.
As a Kenyan who lived through the 2008 post-election
violence and the pain it wrought, I can appreciate the imperative to avoid such
eventualities. However, it is incumbent on all of us to consider the lessons
that the folks in power draw. If, in fact, power transitions are to be
negotiated between incumbents and the international community with immunity from
prosecution offered as an incentive to peacefully vacate office, then that is a
dilution of democratic norms, not a reinforcement of them.
International interventions in support of democratic
norms should not seek to perpetuate the idea that incumbents can negotiate
exits from power. Rather, they should simply seek to enforce the choice of the
people. Unfortunately, the African Union, which has already committed itself to
the profoundly undemocratic ideal of Head of State immunity as evidenced by its
stance in the Kenyan cases at the ICC, sees things differently. Incumbency is
still perceived as an implicit guarantee of impunity.
With support for Jammeh collapsing, and even his army
chief saying he was not willing to fight to defend him from the ECOWAS forces
at his doorstep, there was no imperative to cut a deal. By choosing that
option, the international community did not secure democracy. Rather it
validated the idea that losing despots can use their hapless populations as hostages
to barter for a guilt-free departure. As Solomon Dersso puts it, “they can get
a dignified exit, if they allow free and fair election.”
During last year’s US election campaigns, Donald Trump
was heavily criticized for refusing to state categorically that he would accept
the outcome of the election if he did not win. Four years hence, he will be up
for re-election. If he loses and rejects the results (not as farfetched as one
would think given his continued lying about voter fraud),
does anyone imagine he would be offered a cushy retirement package to
facilitate a peaceful handover of power?